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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Constitutional Law-Due Process Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment May Require Elementary Procedural
Safeguards For Prisoners in Administration of Prison
Discipline
I.

INTRODUCTION

Prisons in the United States house approximately 220,000 felons,'
95 percent of whom will eventually return to society Most state legislatures have delegated to prison administrative bodies the power both to
establish regulations prescribing proper prison conduct and to impose
sanctions for their violation.3 Prison administrators thus have been
granted wide latitude in establishing the procedures by which prisoners
are determined to be guilty of disciplinary infractions and punished.
Frequently, prisoners who allegedly have violated prison standards are
not afforded notice of their offenses, are judged by their accusers, and
are awarded disproportionately severe punishment, such as solitary confinement or loss of good time.4 Judicial review of these post-conviction
disciplinary matters has been limited, for the most part, to extreme
cases.' Consequently, although there is an elaborate system of constitutional safeguards to protect the individual outside of prison, these safeguards frequently provide very little protection for one inside the prison
walls. This Comment will discuss recent developments in case law which
suggest that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that prison inmates be afforded certain rudimentary procedural
standards in the administration of prison discipline.
1.THE

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 161 (1967).

2. Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights
Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REV. 473 (1971).
3. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 18-81 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.14 (Supp.
1972). Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.020 (1969); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7930 (Supp. 1971); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 148-11 (Supp. 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5145.03 (1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
61. § 346 (1964). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (1970).
4. Good time credit, awarded when a prisoner's conduct satisfies prison standards, serves to
advance the prisoner's possible parole date and therefore ultimately reduces the amount of time
spent in prison.
5. See, e.g., Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504 (10th Cir. 1969) (judicial review not permitted
unless prison officials' acts are clearly abusive or capricious); Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548
(4th Cir. 1963) (no right to judicial review unless the punishment is vindictive, cruel, or inhuman).
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TRADITIONAL STANDARDS

Until very recently, the courts were quite reluctant to review the
constitutional validity of disciplinary measures imposed by prison administrators. The explanation most frequently offered for this reluctance is that the courts should defer to the experience and expertise of
prison administrators.' This view, commonly denominated the "handsoff" doctrine, still commands a significant following, as the 1970 case
of Burns v. Swenson well illustrates. 7 In Burns, a "troublemaker" suspected of committing a murderous assault was confined, without a prior
administrative hearing, to a maximum security cell for three years. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that judicial
review of prison discipline practices is to be narrowly limited, that federal courts should be loath to interfere, and that the punishment in the
case before it had not been unconstitutionally administered. When
prison administrative procedures have resulted in systematic and arbitrary deprivations, however, federal courts have manifested greater willingness to intervene.8 This abandonment of the hands-off doctrine has
occurred' when prison punishments and living conditions have been
shown to be cruel and inhuman;10 when restrictions on the free exercise
of religion have been imposed by prison officials;" and when racial
discrimination has been practiced in the prison system.12 Finally, in
6. See, e.g., McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964) (in most instances, judicial
review is impractical and unwarranted); cf. Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 990 (1950) (federal government has no power to regulate the internal discipline of state
penal institutions).
7. 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972). The state had adopted
a set of regulations prescribing certain administrative procedures for disciplinary proceedings, but
prison officials dispensed with them because they felt the prison's security was endangered.
8. See Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970) (absence of defined administrative
procedures may result in an unconstitutional violation of inmates' rights to procedural due process); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (advance notice of charges and
hearing before an impartial tribunal are the minimum procedures necessary); Kritsky v. McGinnis,
313 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (hearing required when prisoner charged with a serious
violation of prison rules); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970) (administrative
hearing required when inmate faced with maximum security confinement).
9. See cases cited note 8 supra.
10. See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th
Cir. 1971) (eighth amendment is violated when punishment or system of punishment offends
concepts of decency and human dignity); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965)
(safeguards surrounding imposition of corporal punishment are required to maintain punishment
within the bounds of eighth amendment).
II. See, e.g., Barnett v. Rogers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (when first amendment rights
are involved, the state must show a compelling state interest in the regulation of the subject).
12. Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), affd per curiam, 390 U.S. 333
(1968) (equal protection clause forbids segregating prisoners on the basis of race).
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Johnson v. Avery,13 the Supreme Court implicitly endorsed judicial
review of prison procedures when it invalidated a prison regulation on
constitutional grounds because the rule prohibited one inmate from
giving legal assistance to another. In Goldberg v. Kelly" the Supreme
Court formulated the following general standard for determining when
a due process violation has occurred in administrative actions: "[P]rocedural due process. . . is influenced by the extent to which [one] may
be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss' . . . and depends upon whether

[his] interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest
in summary adjudication.' !5 In Goldberg, the Supreme Court applied
this "grievous loss" test, holding that an administrative agency could
not terminate welfare benefits without affording the recipient "rudimentary due process." Rudimentary procedural due process, according to
the Court, requires the following safeguards: (1) prior notice of charges;
(2) a hearing before an impartial tribunal in which the accused has the
opportunity to confront his accusers, cross-examine opposing witnesses,
present evidence, and be represented by counsel; and (3) a written decision based upon the evidence at the hearing, including findings of fact
and reasons for the decision. Although the Supreme Court has not
decided a case on procedural due process requirements in the prison
administration context, the lower federal courts have begun to delineate
minimal procedural due process safeguards for prisoners. In Nolan v.
Scafati," for example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals implicitly held
that the absence of clearly defined administrative procedures for imposing punishment may produce an unconstitutional violation of an inmate's right to procedural due process. In Carothers v. Follette,1 7 a
federal district court ruled that a prisoner must be accorded advance
notice of the charges against him as well as a hearing before an impartial
tribunal. Still other federal district courts have required a hearing when13. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
14. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
15. 397 U.S. at 262-63, The Supreme Court has articulated this flexible standard on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961) (the court must determine the nature of the government function involved and the private
interest affected by government action); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960) (the court must
consider the nature of the right, the proceeding, and the potential burden of that proceeding); Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner in which this was
the available alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the
done, the reasons for doing it,
protection implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt
complained of and good accomplished-these are some of the considerations that must enter into
the judicial judgment.").
16. 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970).
17. 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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ever a prisoner is charged with a serious violation of prison rules or is
faced with confinement in maximum security quarters."8 These decisions, however, are in conflict over issues such as the existence of a
prisoner's right to have counsel furnished for him, to cross-examine
witnesses, to present witnesses of his own, to have a written record of
the proceeding, and to have some form of appeal. In the midst of the
ambivalence that has characterized the status of a prisoner's due process
rights, a series of more recent cases has confronted directly the problem of defining which procedural due process safeguards are required

in a prison disciplinary proceeding.
III.

RECENT DECISIONS

In Sostre v. Rockefeller,"9 a convicted narcotics dealer was placed
in solitary confinement for an extended period of time and denied the
benefit of a substantial amount of good time credit because he had made
remarks in letters to his sister and his attorney indicating his connection
with and possible receipt of help from a revolutionary organization, 0
and because he refused to discontinue providing legal assistance to other
inmates. Sostre did not receive written notice of the charges against him,
nor was he afforded an administrative hearing. The warden did discuss
with Sostre his alleged misconduct, but no record of the discussion or
the punishment was made. The district court held that the punishment
had been unconstitutionally imposed, basing its decision in part on the
ground that Sostre had been deprived of the procedural safeguards that
were enunciated by the Court in Goldberg. The district court further
stated that procedural safeguards are necessary whenever the punishment takes the form of punitive segregation, revocation of earned good
time credit, or a denial of the opportunity to accumulate good time. On
appeal, the Second Circuit also found that Sostre's treatment had been
unconstitutional, but stated that the full panoply of specific due process
safeguards ordered by the district court are not constitutionally necessary in every disciplinary action taken against a prisoner.2 ' The court,
in applying Goldberg's grievous loss test, did acknowledge that when
18. See cases cited note 8 supra.
19. 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), revd in partsub nonm. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d
178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
20. Sostre was placed in solitary confinement (prison officials described it as "punitive
segregation") in excess of one year and was denied good time credit of 124 1/3 days. In a letter to
his sister, Sostre had stated that he would "be out soon;" in a letter to his attorney he mentioned
the R.N.A. (Republic of New Africa) and would not answer the warden's questions concerning
that organization.
21. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 198 (2d Cir. 1971).
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prison officials act arbitrarily and capriciously in disciplinary action
that results in severe deprivation, the accused is thereby denied the
rudimentary due process rights to confront his accuser, to be informed
of the evidence against him, and to be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions. The court, however, apparently felt that Sostre's case
did not properly present the question whether the New York prisons
regularly or systematically ignore due process requirements, 22 and therefore concluded that judicial imposition of minimum procedural requirements for all prison disciplinary proceedings represented an inappropriate course of action; this conclusion may perhaps reflect an unwillingness to interfere with the state prison process because 6f the unavailability of empirical data on the administration of prison discipline.
In Bundy v. Cannon,2 72 inmates were transferred to punitive
segregation quarters because of alleged involvement in a work stoppage. 24 The inmates received no notice of the charges before their subsequent hearing and were not permitted to present witnesses or crossexamine their accusers. The board hearing the cases included several
persons who had been involved with the transfer; no written record was
kept of the proceedings or the findings. The federal district court held
that these prison procedures violated the fourteenth amendment because
the inmates did not receive written notice of the charges, and because
the tribunal hearing the cases lacked objectivity and impartiality. The
court found that certain procedural safeguards are required whenever
an inmate may be subjected to a forfeiture of more than five days good
time or to segregated confinement for a period in excess of fifteen days.
The requirements were substantially the same as the guidelines enunciated by the district court in Sostre, but with two exceptions. First, the
Bundy court limited the full right to counsel to representation by a
counsel substitute only. Secondly, the court in Bundy ruled that prisoners must be afforded the right to appeal adverse decisions to the warden
of the institution.
22. The warden charged that Sostre had violated Prison Rule 5 (prisoners are to obey orders
promptly and fully, pending whatever appeal they wish to make) and Rule 12 (prisoners are to
answer questions "truthfully and fully"). The warden concluded that Sostre's attitude "was one of
defiance, of flatly refusing. . . to conduct himself as a proper inmate." Id. at 184. Section 140 of
the New York Correction Law authorized the warden to commit Sostre to segregation when
"necessary . . . to produce [his] entire submission and obedience" and to keep him there "until
he shall be reduced to submission and obedience." Id.
23. 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971).
24. Seventeen of the 72 inmates were charged with specific acts of misconduct. They were
committed indefinitely to maximum security quarters, forfeited 5 days of good time, and were
deprived of accumulating an additional 100 days of good time. The other 55 inmates were transferred to maximum security for "amenability" reasons but neither lost nor forfeited any good time.
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2 5 prisoners at San Quentin alleged that
In Clutchette v. Procunier,
the procedures by which charges of prison rule violations were adjudicated violated fourteenth amendment due process safeguards.2" The district court agreed with the petitioners and set forth the procedural standards of Goldberg as requirements for prison procedural due process.
As in Bundy, however, the court restricted the right to counsel to representation by a counsel substitute; a full right to counsel exists, according
to the court, only when the offense committed by the prisoner could be
referred to the district attorney for a separate criminal prosecution.
Moreover, the Clutchette court unequivocally stated that prisoners do
not possess a constitutional right to appeal a prison hearing to the
warden. The court then limited the applicability of the enumerated
procedural safeguards to the following situations: whenever an inmate
could be subjected to indefinite confinement in any segregated area;
whenever the sentence could be increased; whenever a fine or forfeiture
of accumulated or future earnings might occur; whenever a prisoner
could be confined in isolation for more than ten days; or whenever a
violation could be referred to the district attorney for criminal prosecution. The Clutchette court concluded that the Second Circuit's decision
in Sostre had applied the Goldberg grievous loss test correctly to identify the necessity for meeting minimum procedural due process standards, but had reached the wrong conclusion on the question of specifying procedural requirements. z7
Finally, in Landman v. Royster,28 prisoners brought a class action
in which they sought to register their objections to severe disciplinary
punishment, to challenge regulations that neglected to state which offenses would justify solitary confinement or loss of good time, and to
question the validity of disciplinary committees that did not include
impartial members or provide for written notice of charges, crossexamination, or appeal. The court first distinguished the Sostre Circuit
Court decision on the ground that Landman presented a consistent
pattern of due process violations, but Sostre apparently involved what
could have been an isolated incident. Relying on the Goldberg decision,
the court then balanced the needs of the state against those of the
individual in order to determine the specific procedural safeguards to
which the prisoners constitutionally were entitled. The prisoners, according to the court, were entitled to procedural safeguards comparable

25.
26.
27.
28.

328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
Id. at 773-77.
Id. at 781-84.
333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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to those propounded by the Court in Goldberg, and the safeguards were
necessary for basically the same types of punishment for which the
district court in Sostre would have imposed its set minimal procedural
safeguards. 9 As in Clutchette, however, the Landman court found no
3
requirement for an appellate procedure. 1
IV.

A.

SYNTHESIS OF RECENT CASES

ProceduralDue Process Requirements.

The courts in Landman, Clutchette, Bundy and Sostre determined
which procedural safeguards were required by the fourteenth amendment by applying the Goldberg balancing test, which consists of weighing the individual's interest in not suffering a grievous loss against the
3
state's interest in summary adjudication.
An inmate's interest in obtaining procedural safeguards can be
appreciated readily. Although there are varying degrees of deprivation
within a prison system, an inmate's most basic desire is to avoid arbitrarily imposed punishment. Recent decisions have characterized frustration of this fundamental desire by prison authorities who administer
severe punishments as a grievous loss, because such punishments
amount to nothing less than the imposition of an additional sentence.
The district court in Sostre indicated that the defendant had, in effect,
been "sentenced" to more than one year of punitive segregation 32 without the benefit of minimal procedural safeguards. Moreover, the court
in Clutchette observed that, for many of the same kinds of punishment
imposed upon prisoners, persons outside prison would receive the benefit of substantial due process safeguards.3 3 Inmates thus have a substantial interest in obtaining similar safeguards to ensure that punish29. The court held that whenever a punishment involved solitary confinement, placement in
maximum security, loss of good time, or padlock confinement greater than 10 days, the prison
administration must provide both an impartial tribunal and a hearing in which the accused would
receive written notice of the charges, could submit evidence in his own behalf, cross-examine his
accuser, and have the assistance of counsel substitute. In addition, the court struck down prison
regulations that it characterized as too vague, in an effort to provide fair notice for prisoners and
to avoid arbitrariness on the part of prison officials. Id. at 653-56.
30. The Landman court departed from the Clutchette decision, however, in stating that
counsel isnecessary whenever a prisoner faces the possibility of substantial sanctions and the state
can show no compelling interest in summary adjudication. Unfortunately, the court made no
further effort to clarify that standard and apply it to the specific facts in the case at hand. Id. at
654.
31. 397 U.S. at 262-63.
32. 312 F. Supp. at 872. See also Millemann, Prison DisciplinaryHearingsand Procedural
Due Process- The Requirement of a Full Administrative Hearing, 31 MD. L. REv. 27 (1971).
33. 328 F. Supp. at 780.
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ments are not capriciously imposed.
The various state interests are more difficult to identify and characterize. An attempt by the state to justify punishment of prisoners without procedural due process by classifying the disciplinary action as
merely a termination of privileges would probably be rejected on the
ground that the "federal Constitution circumscribes governmental
power to withhold such benefits arbitrarily or discriminatorily. ' 34 Judicial rejection of the right-privilege distinction also reduces the persuasiveness of the frequently asserted argument that penal sanctions are
imposed to secure the state's interest in "control or security" rather than
to punish inmates. Presumably, labeling a sanction as one that is necessary for control or security is intended to imply that procedural safeguards are superfluous. There is a valid state interest to be served
through efforts designed to promote security or control, but that interest
should not be construed as a justification for discrimination and arbitrary punishment.35 A second argument frequently raised by the State
is that prison discipline is rehabilitative rather than punitive in nature,
and that procedural safeguards are therefore unnecessary or even harmful to successful therapy. The argument is not compelling, however,
because all too frequently the person who actually determines the appropriate punishment to be imposed is not a qualified psychologist, psychiatrist, or similarily trained individual; 31 thus, the sanctions may prove
to be more arbitrary than therapeutic. In Landman, for example, prison
guards and superintendents with less than high school educations retained wide-ranging discretionary power to administer punishments
such as solitary confinement and maximum security.37 Penological experts recognize that routine use of severe punishments embitters rather
than rehabilitates inmates, and destroys rather than builds incentives for
future good behavior.3 A third contention is that the state's interest in
administratively feasible prison disciplinary procedures is thwarted and
undermined by procedural safeguards. The Supreme Court has held,
however, that fundamental consitutional rights cannot be sacrificed for
administrative and fiscal efficiency.39 In Holt v. Sarver," an Arkansas
34. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 644 (E.D. Va. 1971). See also Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (public assistance benefits); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (unemployment compensation).
35. See Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 645 (E.D. Va. 1971).
36. Millemann, supra note 32, at 42.
37. 333 F. Supp. at 631-32.
38. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASS'N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 411-13
(1966).
39. See, e.g., Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 542 (1965); cf Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633, 646-47 (1948).
40. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
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federal district court ordered a complete reorganization of the Arkansas
penal system despite the tremendous cost of the undertaking. Nevertheless, the state does have a legitimate interest in this area, and it should
be weighed against the prisoner's interest in avoiding the chance that the
particular type of deprivation in issue will be arbitrarily imposed. Prison
administrators frequently claim that administrative hearings would necessarily require the presence of security guards for purposes of offering
testimony, thereby either weakening the prison security or imposing a
prohibitive financial burden on the state if it chooses to increase its
security force. The objections are difficult to evaluate, however, in the
absence of empirical data. Some penal experts have hypothesized that
fair and impartial treatment of prisoners would serve a positive rehabilitative function and thus, in the long run, reduce expenditures for prisons.4' Other commentators have concluded that "if additional personnel
are necessary to render prison discipline constitutional and to maintain
security, then they must be provided for in the budget."42 Prison administrators also argue that hearings would erode the traditional inmatestaff relationship because the adversary nature of the proceeding would
briefly elevate the inmates to the same level as the prison staff." This
position, however, seems to have been impliedly rejected by the courts.4
The apparently successful adoption of the Goldberg rudimentary procedural due process requirements by the federal prison system and some
state systems" is perhaps an indication that implementation of these
administrative procedures will not destroy the security, financial stability, or discipline of prisons.
B.

Types of Punishment Requiring an Administrative Hearing.

Although there are numerous variations among the recent cases
discussed, all of them require an administrative hearing whenever the
punitive sanction to be imposed is solitary confinement, punitive segre41. Millemann, supra note 32, at 48.
42. Millemann, supra note 32, at 45-46.
43. See generally Millemann, supra note 32, at 52-54.
44. See, e.g., Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (Ist Cir. 1970) (rejected lower court's argument
that the cross-examination of prison officials would tend to elevate the prisoner to the same level
as the officials).
45. In the federal prison system, regulations require a hearing before the committee authorized to punish the inmate, a record of the hearing, notice at the hearing of the alleged misconduct,
an opportunity to make a statement, the right to counsel-substitute, and an opportunity to appeal

whenever a prisoner is subject to loss of good time. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, POLICY
STATEMENT No. 7400.6, WITHHOLDING, FORFEITURE, AND RESTORATION OF GOOD TIME 1-4
(1966). See also MISSOURI STATE PENITENTIARY, PERSONNEL INFORMATIONAL PAMPHLET RULES
AND PROCEDURES 1-6 (1967); MODEL PENAL CODE § 304.7 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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gation, or loss of good time. 6 The courts have manifested an inclination
to regard these sorts of severe punishment as constituting a grievous

loss. As for solitary confinement or punitive segregation, the cases indicate that the prisoner's potential grievous loss tends to outweigh any

asserted state interest by virtue of the severe deprivation entailed by the
conditions under which such punishments are often administered. Several courts have viewed these penalties as constituting cruel and unusual

punishments because of the abominable living conditions frequently attendant to segregated confinement," the unnecessarily cruel purpose of
the punishment, 8 and the disproportionate severity of the punishment
in relation to the offense. 9 The term grievous loss presents a more

difficult definitional problem when the punishment involved is loss of
good time. Many states have enacted statutes whereby a prisoner may
accumulate good time and thus reduce his sentence substantially or

receive early parole by complying with the prison's regulations.' While
good time credit is an obvious incentive that induces inmate compliance
with prison rules, disciplinary techniques involving denial or forfeiture
of good time raise serious questions. In prison systems in which procedural requirements are limited or nonexistent, the power to grant or
revoke good time is subject to abuse, especially when unqualified prison
guards retain wide discretionary authority to assign punishments. More-

over, it has been suggested that because judges know or should know
the amount of good time that may be accrued under state law and in

practice and may take this factor into consideration in imposing sentences, revocation of good time without meeting minimum procedural
requirements constitutes an unconstitutionally imposed increase in sen46. The terminology used by the various state prisons is varied and often unclear. The
following types of punishment have been specifically designated as requiring procedural due process
safeguards: (A) Landman: solitary confinement, maximum security, loss of good time, and padlock
confinement greater than 10 days; (B) Clutchette: indefinite confinement in the adjustment center
or segregation, possible increase in sentence by referral from the disciplinary committee to the
Adult Authority, a fine or forfeiture of accumulated or future earnings, isolation confinement
greater than 10 days, and referral to the district attorney for criminal prosecution; (C) Bundy:
confinement greater than 15 days and loss of more than 5 days of good time.
47. See Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967) (prisoner was denuded and exposed
to bitter cold for substantial period of time while in solitary confinement); Hancock v. Avery, 301
F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969) (inmate was forced to eat under brutal conditions and sleep nude
on concrete floor).
48. See Dearman v. Woodson, 429 F.2d 1288 (10th Cir. 1970) (official's failure to provide
food for 50 1/2 hours held beyond anything necessary to achieve legitimate penal aims).
49. See Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962) (disproportionate severity
viewed as indicia of unreasonable punishment). See generally Turner, supra note 2, at 492-95.
50. In New York, for example, an inmate may earn as much as 10 days per month of good
time. This potentially reduces a sentence by 33%. N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 230 (McKinney 1966).
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tence. Although this theory is rebuttable on the ground that sentences
do not, or should not, reflect possible accrual of good time, the argument may continue to constitute a persuasive means of establishing the
possibility of a grievous loss. Despite the uniformity of the decisions in
requiring a hearing for punishment involving loss of good time, a question remains whether both revocation of good time earned and denial
of the opportunity to accumulate good time necessarily imply that a
grievous loss has been imposed on the inmate. The Second Circuit's
opinion in Sostre distinguished between the two,5' rejecting the contention that "good time not permitted to accumulate" qualifies as a grievous loss and deferring the question of requiring procedural due process
when prison officials are authorized to revoke good time earned until
future decisions.
C. Scope of ProceduralDue Process.

Whenever a disciplinary proceeding entails punishment that calls
for a hearing before an impartial tribunal, Bundy, Clutchette, Landman,
and the district court's opinion in Sostre require the prison administrator to afford the prison inmate written notice of the charges against him
as well.52 The accused also must be permitted to present his own witnesses, cross-examine his accusers, and have the assistance of counselsubstitute. Only in Bundy did the court require that the prisoner be
afforded a limited right to appeal adverse determinations to the warden. 3 The Clutchette court acknowledged that the law on the question
is unclear, but held that there is no constitutional right to an appeal
from an administrative action.-4 A simple procedure for appeal to the
warden, however, has obvious advantages. The appellate process serves
as a safety valve for administrative hearings, provides the warden with
a means of evaluating the quality of his administrative proceedings, and
affords the administrative hearing program a degree of flexibility. On
the other hand, the right to appeal could produce an increased workload
for prison administrators, because most prisoners would probably invoke their new-found right. A final objection to an informal appellate
procedure offered by prison administrators is that reversal of hearing
51. 442 F.2d at 198. See also FEDERAL BUREAU

OF PRISONS, POLICY STATEMENT

WITHHOLDING, FORFEITURE, AND RESTORATION OF GOOD TIME

No. 7400.6,

(1966). This policy statement does

draw a distinction between the forfeiture of good time previously earned and the withholding of
good time during the month in which the infraction occurs. Forfeiture of good time is considered
a more severe punishment that necessitates greater procedural safeguards.
52. 442 F.2d at 198.
53. 328 F. Supp. at 177. The court held that appeal is mandatory for all major violations.
54. 328 F. Supp. at 784.
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decisions by the warden would tend to diminish the effectiveness of the
official who initiated the proceeding and perhaps would contribute to
further disciplinary problems.
The recent cases also disagree over the question of the prisoner's
right to counsel. The district court opinions in Sostre55 and Landman"
unequivocally state that there is a right to counsel when substantial
sanctions are possible and when no compelling government interest in
summary adjudication is shown. In the Bundy decision, however, the
court did not mention the right to counsel, and the court in Clutchette
would limit the right to cases in which the inmate could be prosecuted
by the district attorney.57 The primary difficulty in resolving the rightto-counsel issue appears to stem from practical considerations; since
over 90 percent of all inmates qualify as indigents, state financial and
legal resources may prove to be insufficient to provide lawyers at all
prison disciplinary hearings." A second problem is that courts consistently have held that there is no right to counsel for various other types
of administrative hearings. 9 A practical solution that is consistent with
the rationale of Goldberg would be to follow the court's holding in
Clutchette and permit the inmate the assistance of counsel only when
the prisoner is subject to prosecution by the district attorney and the
evidence taken at the administrative hearing could be used against the
prisoner in subsequent proceedings.
V.

CONCLUSION

Landman, Bundy and Clutchette define the outer limits of judicial
intervention on procedural due process grounds into the workings of
prison disciplinary proceedings. Although a growing number of courts
have imposed procedural requirements upon the administration of
prison discipline, a substantial number of jurisdictions continue to adhere to the rationale of the hands-off doctrine. For those courts willing
to break with the traditional hands-off approach, it is probable that in
light of Landman, Bundy, and Clutchette, minimum procedural due
process safeguards will be afforded whenever solitary confinement, loss
of good time, or a similarly severe punishment might be administered.
55. 312 F. Supp. at 872.
56. 333 F. Supp. at 654.
57. 328 F. Supp. at 783.
58. Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate Rights, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REV.
227, 243-44 & n.94 (1970).
59. See, e.g., Murphy v. Turner, 426 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1970) (revocation of parole);
Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967) (expulsion from school).
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The procedural safeguards required whenever a prisoner faces any of
these punishments will probably include notice of the charges and a
hearing before an impartial tribunal in which the accused can confront
his accuser, be represented by counsel-substitute, and present his own
evidence. Implementation of such procedural requirements poses few
substantial difficulties, and the potential gain to the imprisoned and
prison administrators far outweighs economic and administrative costs.
The right to retained or appointed counsel and the right of appeal,
however, cannot be implemented so simply, and therefore remain unresolved issues as demonstrated by the conflicting opinions in Landman,
Bundy, Sostre and Clutchette. Resolution of these conflicts in future
cases will require a finer balancing of the individual's interest in not
suffering a grievous loss against the state's interest in summary adjudication.

